On May 30, 2013, Ontario’s Minister of Energy Bob Chiarelli
announced changes to the FIT program. Most significant are the declared end of
Feed-in Tariffs on “Large FIT” projects (those with nameplate capacity >
500kW); the continuation of the “Small FIT” (10-500kW) and MicroFIT (<10kW)
Programs, with 900MW to be allotted over the next four years; the stated intent
to eliminate domestic content requirements; and an enhanced role for
municipalities, including the prioritization of projects with municipal ownership
(“participation” in OPA parlance).
At the same venue, the OPA’s Shawn Cronkwright revealed the
results of the current round of FIT applications. For the past two weeks
applicants have been receiving notices of whether their applications had been
terminated as “incomplete” or “ineligible”, or whether they were successful and
would move on to the TAT/DAT. Of some 825MW of applications, it turns out that
only 192.8MW successfully applied to the program. The rest of the
applications – over 75% of the kW – have been terminated.
Over the past year, the renewable energy co-operative (REC)
sector has expanded from about a dozen RECs to about 60, as developers and
communities got together to avail of the new FIT 2.0 Rules which favoured,
through the Priority Points system, applications for projects with co-op “participation”
– that is, equity input from co-ops (all of whose members are natural persons resident
in Ontario). With the attrition rate among applicants, it turns out the highly
prized “points” for co-op participation are redundant: there is no points
competition, as the number of eligible applicants is already reduced below the
200MW planned contract allotment.
The elimination of applications has made not only the points
system redundant, but has also eliminated any competitive advantage for earlier
applicants: pre-existing time stamps are thus redundant as well.
The irony of all this will not be lost on those property
owners and developers who quite reasonably believed that they would have little
chance at getting a contract unless they partnered with an aboriginal group or
a co-op. Now they’ve partnered, selling off between 15% and 51% of their
projects, incurred legal fees to draw up joint venture and other agreements,
spent significant time negotiating terms, all in order to gain an advantage
that turns out to be completely unnecessary.
Indeed, it now seems that partnering would in fact have put
applicants at a disadvantage. Ultimately, given attrition, the key to getting a
contract turns out to be simply submitting a complete and correct application.
But the participation projects had to fill out more Prescribed Forms than
others, which left more room for mistakes to be made. Higher points thus meant
higher risks in the application stage (and higher future risks, which will be
the subject of a future post).
Interestingly, this appears not to have affected Applicants
as might have been expected. According to statistics provided by OPA (see http://powerauthority.on.ca/news/shawn-cronkwright-cansias-solar-ontario-2013
and the table below), a total of 3938
applications were submitted, and 1163 passed through Stage 1&2. This
represents a success rate of 29.5% (only 23% if we count in terms of kW). The
proportion of these that were participation projects changed little between
application and announcement, which suggests that overall participation projects
were not at a disadvantage – or that perhaps they generally worked harder to
ensure quality applications.
Within the participation projects, the quality of
applications (as measured by successfully passing Stage 1&2) was lowest
among aboriginal participation projects, which dropped from 41.8% of
applications to 24.2% of successful applications. Quality was highest among
Education and Health Participation projects, which jumped from 23.6% to 38.3%
of successful applications. Co-op representation improved somewhat, from 11.6%
to 14.7%, though the proportion of Capacity Set-Aside (CCSA) applicants
remained constant.
Applications
|
Submitted
|
Submitted (%)
|
Successful (Stage 1&2)
|
Successful (Stage 1&2)
|
Aboriginal
|
1645
|
41.8%
|
281
|
24.2%
|
Of which CCSA
|
494
|
12.5%
|
109
|
9.3%
|
Co-op
|
458
|
11.6%
|
171
|
14.7%
|
Of which CCSA
|
326
|
8.3%
|
95
|
8.2%
|
Education/Health
|
930
|
23.6%
|
446
|
38.3%
|
Total Participation Projects
|
3033
|
77.0%
|
898
|
77.2%
|
No Participation
|
905
|
23%
|
265
|
22.8%
|
Total
|
3938
|
1163
|
1163
|
All of this suggests there was no inherent disadvantage, or
higher risk, for participation projects. In these applications there was
however substantially more work involved; and there may have been a higher
level of diligence applied by applicants, though this would be difficult to
verify. It’s clear that many applicants feel the elimination of applications
was at times rather arbitrary, which if true suggests that diligence played a
lesser role than the whims of the bureaucracy.
Nor, as it turns out, was there any advantage to having a
partner or points (due to attrition eliminating this competition). So we might reasonably ask, what was the point
of all that?
Well, some of us in the sector have noted a distinct
tendency for the OPA to make us jump through hoops for no apparent reason,
except perhaps to satisfy a certain sadistic tendency within that bureaucracy. That’s
perhaps overly speculative.
But it certainly seems that the Ministry wanted to see
co-ops and aboriginal groups participate in project ownership, and that wish
has been fulfilled: fully 77% of applications in line for TAT/DAT have either
aboriginal, co-op, or education/health ownership or siting.
That much of these community-owned kW were effectively
expropriated from developers and property owners by stealth is an issue that
remains to be assessed. I am thinking of the farmer who sold 15% of his project
to a co-op because it seemed he had to if he wanted a contract. On the other
hand, what of the projects that didn’t even apply, because they didn’t feel they
stood a chance without taking on partners, and who simply stepped out of the
game.
Looking ahead, as the Ministry has announced its intent to
procure (via OPA) another 70MW under a second small FIT window before the end
of 2013, no doubt a large number of the recently terminated applications will
be re-submitted. Assuming we’ve learned through this process what needs to be
done to submit complete and eligible applications, there may well be a genuine
points competition in the next round.
What we don’t know yet is how the priority points will be structured
in the next round. Municipalities are clearly slated to be sources of points,
but what is not yet confirmed is if co-ops and aboriginal groups will maintain
their (so recently won) attractiveness. I’m betting they will – I think it
would be folly for the Ministry to back away from this initiative so soon – but
I won’t bet much until the Ministry makes a stronger statement.
As ever, uncertainty is a key theme under the evolving
landscape of renewable energy in Ontario.